Berlin Blockade Totally Explained

Everything about The Berlin Blockade totally explained

The Berlin Blockade (June 24 1948 – May 11 1949) was one of the first major international crises of the Cold War. During the multinational occupation of post-World War 2 Germany, the Soviet Union -- a wartime ally of the three other occupying nations (the U.S., UK, and France) -- blocked the three Western powers' railroad and street access to the western sectors of Berlin that they'd been controlling. The crisis abated after the Western powers bypassed the blockade by establishing the Berlin Airlift, demonstrating both their dedication to the cause of supplying their respective zones, as well as the industrial might of Western Civilization (and its air forces' capabilities).

Postwar division of Germany

When World War II ended in Europe on May 8 1945, Soviet and Western (U.S. and British) troops were stretched across Germany on a line running roughly along the Elbe, although branching off in several locations. Units of the (re-forming) French army were also present in southwest Germany.
From July 17 to August 2 1945, the victorious Allied Powers reached the Potsdam Agreement on the fate of postwar Europe, calling for the division of the defeated Germany into four occupation zones (thus re-affirming principles laid out earlier by the Yalta Conference), roughly located around their respective armies' pre-existing locations. Additionally, the German capital of Berlin would be divided into four zones. However, because of the city's location (deep within eastern Germany) the French, American, and British sectors of Berlin were surrounded by the Soviet's overall occupation zone. Administration of occupied Germany was coordinated by the Four Power Allied Control Council (ACC).
Part of the overall agreement was encoded in the Morgenthau Plan, which was based on the basic concept that Germany's economy would be re-constructed at 50% of its 1938 capacity, so that a militarized Germany couldn't re-emerge in the future. The Soviets were in favor of the plans, a response to the repeated German assaults on Russia. As Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov told United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in 1946, they wanted to see a united Germany that could be neutralized after the Soviet Union received industrial reparations. The U.S.'s JCS 1067 reflected these goals, stating that the U.S. occupation would "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy." As a part of these plans, factories in the U.S. Zone of Control were disassembled and sent eastward, thereby fulfilling both the reduction in German industrial capacity and the provision of Soviet reparations.

Differing views

The effects of the Morgenthau Plan were far more wide-reaching than originally predicted. The effect of Germany's industrial economy on that of Europe's total economy was greatly underestimated; after the Plan's implementation, the now-suppressed German economy began dragging down the whole continent's economy. Conditions became so bad that William L. Clayton, an economic adviser to then -U.S. President Harry S. Truman at the Potsdam Conference, reported back to Washington, D.C. that "millions of people are slowly starving."
   At first, this outcome didn't change the U.S. policy on Germany (which continued to follow the Morgenthau Plan as encoded in JCS 1067). However, in view of increased concerns by the U.S.'s General Lucius D. Clay and its Joint Chiefs of Staff over growing Communist influence in Germany, plus Europe's now-plunging economy, in summer 1947 U.S. Secretary of State General George Marshall -- citing "national security grounds" -- was able to finally convince President Truman to rescind directive JCS 1067. It was replaced with JCS 1779, which completely reversed JCS 1067. Among other features, it stated that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany.”
   As part of the developing Marshall Plan, large sums of U.S. capital were freed up for use by any European nation that requested it. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was highly suspect of these U.S. plans; they disrupted his dream of a non-military "buffer"-state Germany, and he felt that this U.S. aid would "buy" a pro-U.S. re-alignment of the new Europe, expanding the U.S.'s influence to near-imperial size. He stated "This is a ploy by Truman. It is nothing like Lend-Lease -- a different situation. They don't want to help us. What they want is to infiltrate European countries." Molotov was initially interested in the program and attended its early meetings, but later described it as "dollar imperialism". Stalin eventually forbade any countries of the newly-formed Cominform from accepting the aid, which required some strong-arm tactics in the case of Czechoslovakia.
   As the U.S. and Soviet/U.S.S.R. policies toward Germany changed in light of its terrible economic conditions, the former Allies grew apart. To Stalin, it remained essential to destroy Germany's capacity for waging another war; but, this conflicted with U.S. desires to re-build Germany as the economic center of a stable Europe. Little common ground could be found, and attempts between the two superpowers to further clarify post-war plans for a unified Germany stalled. In 1946 the Soviets stopped delivering agricultural goods from their zone in eastern Germany, and Clay responded by stopping shipments of dismantled industries from western Germany. As a result, the Soviets started a public relations campaign against American policy, and began to obstruct the administrative work of all four zones of occupation.
   The U.S. stance was that if it couldn't re-unify Germany with Soviet cooperation, the West should develop Germany's western, industrial portions (controlled by the UK and U.S.), and integrate these areas into a new western European sphere known as the "Bizone" (to be re-named the Trizone, when France would join it). Led by the U.S., these three major Western powers reached an agreement on this approach during a series of meetings in London, from February to June 1948. As outlined in an announcement on March 7 1948, the London Conference declared support for fusing the three Western zones of Germany into an independent, federal form of government, and bringing Western zones into the U.S.-led economic reconstruction efforts.

Focus on Berlin

Berlin quickly became the focal point of both U.S. and Soviet efforts to re-align Europe in their respective visions. As Molotov noted, "What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe." A key event took place earlier, in 1946, when Berlin's citizens overwhelmingly elected democratic members to its city council (with an 86% majority) -- strongly rejecting the election's Communist candidates. It appeared that any future effort to re-unite Germany would lead to, or first require, the expulsion of the Soviet elements; the Western nation's tactics demonstrated that they'd be more than willing to support such an outcome.
The ACC met for the last time on March 20, 1948. After asking for details of the London meetings and failing to get them immediately, Vasily Sokolovsky stated "I see no sense in continuing this meeting, and I declare it adjourned." The entire Soviet delegation arose and walked out. But Sokolovsky was the chair of the council during March, and therefore in charge of scheduling future ACC meetings. He simply didn't call for any future meetings; therefore, the ACC effectively ended. Truman later noted "For most of Germany, this act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time, namely, that the four-power control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was the curtain-raiser for a major crisis."
General Clay felt that the Soviets were bluffing -- that they wouldn't want to be viewed as starting a third world war -- about Berlin. He proposed sending a large, armored convoy driving peacefully -- as a moral right -- down the Autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin; but, with instructions to fire if it were stopped or attacked. President Truman, however, following the consensus in Congress, stated, "It is too risky to engage in this due to the consequence of war."

Deciding on an airlift

Although the ground routes had never been negotiated, the same wasn't true of the air. On November 30, 1945, it was agreed, in writing, that there would be three twenty-mile wide air corridors providing free access to the city. Additionally, unlike a force of tanks, the Soviets couldn't claim that cargo aircraft were some sort of military threat. In the face of an unarmed aircraft refusing to turn around, the only way to enforce the blockade would be to shoot them down. An airlift would force the Soviet Union into the position of either taking military action in a morally reprehensible fashion that would break their own agreements, or backing down.
   Forcing this decision would require the airlift to actually work, however. If the supplies couldn't be flown in fast enough, Soviet help would eventually be needed in order to prevent starvation. Clay was told to take advice from General Curtis LeMay, commander of United States Air Forces in Europe, to see if an airlift was possible. LeMay replied "We can haul anything."
   When the American forces consulted the British Royal Air Force about a possible joint airlift, they learned that the RAF was already running an airlift in support of their own troops in Berlin. Clay's counterpart, Commander Sir Brian Robertson, was ready with some concrete numbers. During the Little Lift earlier that year, British Air Commodore Reginald Waite had calculated the resources required to support the entire city. His calculations indicated they'd need to supply seventeen hundred calories per person per day, consisting of 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64 tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking, 144 tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese. In total, 1,534 tons were needed daily to keep the over 2 million people alive. Carrying this out wouldn't be easy. The post-war demobilization had left the U.S. forces in Europe with only two squadrons of C-47 Skytrain planes, which could each carry about 3.5 tons of cargo. Clay estimated they'd be able to haul about 300 tons of supplies a day. The RAF was somewhat better prepared as they'd already moved some aircraft into the area, and they expected to be able to supply about 400 tons a day. This wasn't nearly enough to move the 5,000 tons a day that would be needed, but these numbers could be increased as new aircraft arrived from England and the U.S. The RAF would be relied on to increase their numbers quickly; they could fly additional aircraft in from England in a single hop, bringing their fleet to about 150 C-47s and 40 of the larger Avro Yorks with 10 ton payload. With this fleet the British contribution was expected to rise to 750 tons a day in the short term. For a longer-term operation the U.S. would have to add additional aircraft as soon as possible, and they'd have to be as large as possible while still able to fly into the Berlin airports. Only one such aircraft type was suitable, the C-54 Skymaster, and its U.S. Navy equivalent, the R5D.
   Given the feasibility assessment made by the British, the airlift concept appeared to be the best course of action. A remaining concern was the population of Berlin. Clay called in Ernst Reuter, the Mayor-elect of Berlin, who was accompanied by his aide, Willy Brandt. Clay told Reuter, "Look, I'm ready to try an airlift. I can't guarantee it'll work. I'm sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold and people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won't stand that, it'll fail. And I don't want to go into this unless I've your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval." Reuter, although skeptical, assured Clay that Berlin would make all the necessary sacrifices and that the Berliners would support his actions.
   During the first week the airlift averaged only ninety tons a day, but by the second week it reached 1000 tons. This likely would have sufficed had the effort lasted only a few weeks, as originally believed. The Communist press in East Berlin, for its part, ridiculed the efforts. It derisively referred to "the futile attempts of the Americans to save face and to maintain their untenable position in Berlin."

Black Friday

As it became clear the Soviets were not going to relent any time soon, more drastic measures were called for. On July 27 1948 Lt. General William H. Tunner of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) took over the operation. Tunner had significant experience in commanding and organizing the airlift over the Burma Hump.
A total of 101 fatalities were recorded as a result of the operation, including 39 Britons and 31 Americans, mostly due to crashes. Seventeen American and eight British aircraft crashed during the operation.

Afterward

Operational control of the three allied airlift corridors was given to BARTCC (Berlin Air Route Traffic Control Center) air traffic control located at Tempelhof. Diplomatic approval authority was granted to a four-power organization called the Berlin Air Safety Center, also located in the American sector.
Tegel was developed into (West-) Berlin's principal airport; by 2007, it had been joined by a re-developed Berlin-Schoenefeld in Brandenburg. As a result of the development of these two airports, Tempelhof is being closed, while Gatow is now home of the Museum of the German Luftwaffe. During the 1970s and 1980s, Schoenefeld had its own crossing points through the Berlin Wall for western citizens.

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